The initiative of the Hamas movement and the resistance to launch the "Al-Aqsa Flood" offensive stunned and bewildered the Israeli government, military, and security apparatus. October 7th was, as the famous Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea stated, "the worst day in the history of the military wars Israel has fought." And as Ben Caspit wrote, Hamas aimed from it to obtain a picture of victory and returned with a full album.

To grasp the dimensions of what happened and the reasons for the disgraceful defeat, we must understand the significant impact of the deep internal crisis Israel is experiencing under the most extremist government in its history, a government striving to change Israel into a dictatorial state even for Jews. We must also understand what Israeli leaders, experts, and journalists have written: that it was a massive political, intelligence, and military failure. This failure indicates a fragility no one imagined existed in one of the world's strongest and best armies, reflects the arrogance of power, and demonstrates complete recklessness that reached the point of total blindness—to the extent of not heeding military maneuvers conducted by the Al-Qassam Brigades that mimicked what happened shortly before the Al-Aqsa Flood.

It also indicates the efficiency, courage, and advancement of the Palestinian fighter, and a leadership capability that showed skills in planning, command, control, concealment, and confusion, as well as strategic and intelligence deception.

When comparing the Al-Aqsa Flood to the battles, military rounds, and resistance operations since 2005 until now, it appears that Israel lost around 400 dead over 18 years. Meanwhile, according to Israeli sources as of this writing, more than 1,000 soldiers and civilians fell on October 7th alone, with estimates that the number could reach 1,500, and the toll is still rising. The dead are being acknowledged in installments to avoid causing horrific shock to Israelis living in bewilderment, frustration, and collective mourning, alongside more than 2,200 wounded—hundreds in critical condition—and between 100-150 captives, including female recruits, soldiers, officers, and commanders, with hundreds still missing.

For comparison, 650 Israelis fell in the June 1967 war fought against three Arab countries, the same number in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and over 1,000 during the 18 years of operations to liberate southern Lebanon. In the Al-Aqsa Intifada, around 1,100 Israelis were killed over four years.

A Resounding Collapse of the Israeli Deterrence Theory

The enormous scale of losses in one day is unprecedented and has led to the resounding collapse of the Israeli deterrence theory. This theory was based, first, on maintaining the initiative in war and aggression, whereas this time the resistance brigades initiated. Second, it was based on confining the battle to the enemy's internal front, while the main battlefield during the launch of Al-Aqsa Flood was the Israeli internal front. Third, controlling the end of the war—something we have not yet reached, as the war is still in its early stages. Fourth, ending the war as quickly as possible because a prolonged war inflicts severe damage on Israel, its economy, and its prestige. Fifth, achieving the intended war objectives—this has not and will not be achieved regardless of the war's course and results. Because what happened on its first day, the huge losses and indescribable humiliation, will remain a glaring mark of defeat for the "invincible army," no matter the final results, and an inspiring embodiment of the resistance's victory.

Why the Al-Aqsa Flood, and Precisely at this Time?

First Reason: The assumption of power in Israel by the most extremist government in its history, which claimed it was capable of decisively settling the conflict with the Palestinians—something previous governments failed to achieve—and refused even to negotiate with the Palestinians. It kept the relationship with the Palestinian Authority, despite its cooperation with the occupation, within an economic-security ceiling. It adopted a program of annexation, displacement, Judaization, military aggression in all its forms, and racism in all its forms, persisting in its arrogance through killings, home demolitions, arrests, assassinations, and changing the status of Al-Aqsa by imposing temporal division and nearing the achievement of spatial division as a prelude to demolishing it and erecting the alleged Temple in its place.

Second Reason: The continued tight siege on the Gaza Strip, keeping it between life and death as the largest and longest prison in history, imposing an equation of calm in exchange for economic facilitations, constantly breaching understandings aimed at easing the siege, non-recognition of Hamas, and manipulating it by easing the siege through a drip-feed approach, withdrawing it whenever the occupation government wishes. This led to the deterioration of the situation in Gaza to the point where it was on the verge of collapse, rebellion against the de facto authority, or exploding in the face of the racist colonial settler entity—and the explosion is what ultimately happened.

Third Reason: The significant increase in the number of detainees and prisoners, and the enactment of racist laws and intensified repression and punishments against them by the fascist minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, reaching over 1,200 administrative detainees, many serving very long periods. This occurs amid Israeli governments' evasiveness over nine years (since 2014) without completing a new prisoner exchange deal. To understand the importance of this reason, we must remember that many of the current influential Hamas decision-makers are among those released in the last prisoner exchange deal, and they pledged and committed to freeing the prisoners. This places them in a very embarrassing position. We all heard the speech of the Prisoners' Leadership Committee on the anniversary of Hamas's founding in December 2022, which contained significant, sharp, and direct criticism of the Hamas leadership for not fulfilling its pledge to release the prisoners.

Fourth Reason: News about advancing Saudi-Israeli negotiations, under American patronage, to reach a normalization deal that ignores the Palestinian cause by treating it as a humanitarian issue. Realizing the dimensions and implications of this step, and what it would lead to—encouraging the messianic government to launch a larger, comprehensive attack to succeed in a plan to liquidate the Palestinian cause in all its dimensions—certainly one of the main goals of this plan after Saudi normalization would be targeting the resistance in Gaza and elsewhere. Past experience has proven that every Arab normalization leads to Israeli military aggression against the Palestinians. Therefore, what the resistance said about having information about an Israeli plan to launch a large military aggression on Gaza immediately after the holiday celebrations cannot be ruled out as one of the causes.

To understand the impact of this reason, we must place it in the context of the competition and struggle for leadership of the new world, which is intensifying under the counter-offensive launched by the Biden administration to stop its decline and maintain unilateral American control over the world. Perhaps the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor is indicative of the danger of the normalization being worked towards, as it harms China's Belt and Road project, paves the way for liquidating the Palestinian cause, and harms Russia, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.

Possible Scenarios

Undoubtedly, the Al-Aqsa Flood will completely, or at least significantly, change the rules of engagement that have governed Palestinian-Israeli relations for the next twenty years, and will have major regional and international repercussions. Israeli governments have invested in the Palestinian division, which remains a golden goose for the occupation. This included de facto recognition of Hamas's continued rule in the Strip, within the equation of calm for facilitations, while ensuring the launch of military aggression after aggression to strike the resistance and its infrastructure, preventing it from forming a serious threat to the occupation.

What happened in Al-Aqsa Flood decisively indicates the failure of this policy. The resistance has accumulated its strength and managed to present an inspiring model in terms of planning, training, camouflage, misleading and disabling surveillance and monitoring systems, and strategic deception. This will push the Israeli government to seek terrible revenge commensurate with the shock and terror Israel experienced. I repeat the advice offered by Dr. Walid Abdel Hay not to disclose the number of captives, but only a part of them, which is sufficient to empty the prisons, to achieve other goals, and in anticipation of re-arresting those released after their freedom, as Israeli governments have done more than once.

Scenario One: A Destructive Israeli Response that Eradicates the Resistance
This scenario is based on Benjamin Netanyahu's government carrying out its threats to eliminate the resistance and Hamas's rule, responding to the advice, calls, and demands from its extremely extremist public and right-wing theorists like Dan Sheftan, who advised destroying Gaza and not tying the Israeli army's hands due to the large number of captives held by the Al-Qassam Brigades and Al-Quds Brigades, lest what happened be repeated on a Palestinian and Arab scale. This scenario could reach the point of reoccupying the Gaza Strip.

This scenario is possible, but there are several reasons limiting its possibility:

1. Achieving the set objectives necessitates a prolonged ground battle and reoccupation of the Strip. Even if that happens, it will not eliminate the resistance. Evidence: The occupation forces have not succeeded in eliminating the resistance in the Jenin camp despite repeated assaults, so how will they eliminate it in Gaza, which has a vast tunnel network, tens of thousands of rockets, and similarly numbers of trained and prepared fighters? Additionally, a ground offensive will inflict heavy losses on Israeli forces and Israel—human, moral, and specifically economic—its economy cannot withstand a long war. Israel loses billions of dollars daily; the shekel's decline, stock market losses, and halted flights to and from Ben Gurion Airport are merely samples and indicators.

2. If the war reaches the point of destroying the Strip and toppling Hamas's rule, it opens the door for Hezbollah to enter the war. It is inconceivable that the Palestinian resistance would launch Al-Aqsa Flood without at least agreeing with Hezbollah to open the northern front. The early warning message represented by Hezbollah firing rockets on the second day at Israeli targets in the Shebaa Farms indicates a serious possibility of Hezbollah's involvement if Israel goes too far in its war on Gaza.

3. The American administration, along with Western countries and NATO, do not want a regional war to erupt while the Ukrainian war is still raging. Any new war would benefit Russia and its leader Vladimir Putin. Perhaps Biden's warnings, military build-ups, and dispatch of warships and an aircraft carrier are more an attempt to prevent a regional war than an invitation to one.

4. Destroying Gaza, seeking to eliminate the resistance, and toppling Hamas's rule will lead to a long war, escalation of resistance in the West Bank, increased likelihood of the Authority's collapse, and Fatah's alignment with the resistance. This opens the option of Palestinian unity and turning the page on the dark chapter of division on a national and participatory basis. If this happens, it would foil all plans laid for building the "New Middle East."

5. Occupying Gaza, if it happens, will not eliminate the resistance after it gained great popularity through Al-Aqsa Flood, especially in the absence of a strong, legitimate Palestinian party willing to replace Hamas's authority.

Scenario Two: An Israeli Response that Does Not Change the Rules of Engagement
This scenario is based on the Israeli government carrying out a strong response and revenge without completely and once-and-for-all changing the rules of engagement, seeking to achieve Israeli objectives in stages and batches. Under this scenario, we might witness more than others special operations inside Gaza and assassination operations inside and outside Gaza to obtain a picture of victory.

This scenario is reinforced by the large number of captives held by the resistance, and pursuing a war of destruction would lead to the killing of many of them. Israel needs to study and address the causes of the shortcomings that were revealed, showing them to be weaker than a spider's web.

Scenario Three: Straddling Between the First and Second Scenarios
This scenario is based on the occupation forces carrying out a strong response, standing on the brink of completely changing the rules of engagement without actually proceeding to do so. This is a dangerous game but cannot be completely ruled out.

The Goal of Ending the Occupation is Achievable

It is too early to decide and favor a specific scenario, as the war is in its beginnings and its mysteries and secrets have not been unraveled. The resistance announced it carried out Al-Aqsa Flood because it had information that the occupation army was preparing to execute aggression against it after the Jewish holidays ended. The resistance has not specified its war objectives: whether it is merely a preemptive defensive step, or aims to free prisoners, lift the siege, and prevent threats to Al-Aqsa and holy sites, or whether a larger goal lies behind it, like ending the occupation of the territories occupied in 1967. Therefore, Al-Aqsa Flood will continue hoping that the West Bank and Palestinian interior will rise up, and Arab and international solidarity movements with the Palestinian cause will be launched.

I call for setting this goal (ending the occupation), which can be achieved over several years, all at once or in batches—if it wasn't already the original goal—because Al-Aqsa Flood has strongly proven its possibility. Without a big goal like ending the occupation, Al-Aqsa Flood—despite its historical importance—becomes merely a new glorious page in the Palestinian journey, which is very important but not enough.

Does What is Happening Open a Political Horizon?

The question posed by some senior observers of events is: Can the experience of the October War, which led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, be repeated?

The initial response is that the circumstances are different, and the goals of the players are different. Sadat waged war with a settlement in mind, which is why it was called a war of attrition/movement, not a war of liberation.

A settlement cannot be achieved, even if flawed, due to the absence of an Israeli partner for any settlement, even if a unity government is formed in Israel. But liquidation could be achieved if the resistance is defeated and Israeli objectives are realized; then there would be a capitulationist solution, which has become more difficult now if not impossible. Then the normalization train would resume its course, along with the plan to establish the New Middle East, and the Authority would represent the Palestinian side.

However, these are pipe dreams. What happened in Al-Aqsa Flood and its implications prove once again the overwhelming popularity of the resistance option and the impossibility of bypassing the Palestinian people and their rights. They are the formidable factor, whether others like it or not.